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Abstract
Incentive contracts must typically be based on performance measures that
do not exactly match agentstrue contribution to principalsobjectives. Such
misalignment may impose di¢ culties for e¤ective incentive design. We analyze
to what extent implicit dynamic incentives such as career concerns and ratchet
e¤ects alleviate or aggravate these problems. Our analysis demonstrates that
the interplay between distorted performance measures and implicit incentives
implies that career and ratchet e¤ects have real e¤ects, that career and mone-
tary incentives may be complements, and that stronger ratchet e¤ects or more
distortion may increase optimal monetary incentives.
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1 Introduction
A general problem for designing incentive schemes is that available performance mea-
sures seldom capture precisely agentstrue contributions to principalsobjectives.
Performance measures are typically inuenced by stochastic factors that agents cant
control, and they often do not reect all aspects that principals care about. For in-
stance, quantitative performance measures often neglect important qualitative (soft)
aspects of an agents performance. Such measures are distorted from, or not well
aligned with, the principals true objectives. As is well known, such misalignments
may impose severe di¢ culties for e¤ective incentive design. (Holmstrom and Mil-
grom 1991; Baker 1992; Feltham and Xie 1994; and Baker 2002.)
Baker (2002) argues that an understanding of how distorted performance mea-
sures a¤ect the design of incentive contracts may explain several issues and puzzles
in the literature; including (i) why high-signal-to-nose ratio performance measures
may receive low weight in an incentive scheme, (ii) how the distinction between
paying for inputs versus paying for outputs can be interpreted, and (iii) why
seemingly informative performance measures degrade, (Baker 2002, pp. 738-40).
The latter issue is illustrated by a school system that administers standardized tests
to its students, but does not use the scores to motivate teachers. A reason for not
including these seemingly informative test scores as a performance measure in an in-
centive system, is that teachers will then have incentives to teach to the test, and
may thus engage in dysfunctional behavior that increases the performance measure
without increasing the schools real objective.
Here we want to point out that, while it certainly is true that incentives to
teach to the testare a¤ected by direct monetary rewards, it may nevertheless well
be the case that teachers face incentives to engage in this kind of behavior even if
such direct monetary rewards are absent. Good test scores may for example give
the school administration a signal that the teacher is valuable, and result in future
salary increases. Or, test scores may be used as a criterion to allocate teachers to
di¤erent classes. A complete understanding of how distorted performance measures
a¤ect overall incentive design requires that implicit incentives are also taken into
account.
In this paper we analyse the interplay between implicit dynamic incentives and
explicit incentives based on distorted performance measures. We examine to what
extent such implicit incentives alleviate or aggravate problems related to distorted
measures. Implicit incentives of this form arise when explicit contracts can be rene-
gotiated as time unfolds. Hence, implicit incentives reect the fact that future
periodspay depends on todays performance. If todays performance improves the
agents position in the labor market, career concerns are present, (Fama 1980; Holm-
strom 1982; and Gibbons and Murphy 1992). Ratchet e¤ects are present if better
performance today implies a tougher performance standard tomorrow, (Weitzman
1976).
The analysis is based on a dynamic version of the model developed in Baker
(2002). First we consider the case where the principal can provide incentives on
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a veriable, but distorted, performance measure (z). In addition some information
about the agents performance is provided to the principal (and the market) through
the non-veriable value measure (y) that reects how the agents performance con-
tributes to the principals true objective. In this case implicit incentives are related
both to the distorted and the undistorted performance measures (and hence the
degree of misalignments between them).
By using this model we show that both career and ratchet e¤ects do have real
e¤ects; neither can costlessly be neutralized by monetary incentives. Furthermore
we nd, contrary to what is found models with non-distorted performance mea-
sures (e.g. Gibbons 1987; Meyer, Olsen, and Torsvik 1996; and Meyer and Vickers
1997), that stronger ratchet e¤ects may increase optimal monetary incentives. The
intuition behind this result is that the ratchet e¤ect works through both the true
value measure and through the veriable performance measure. If it is the case that
stronger ratchet e¤ects reduce net implicit incentives on the true value measure,
then the principal should increase monetary incentives on the veriable measure to
compensate for the former e¤ects. Finally we notice that this dynamic model repro-
duces some of the results of the static version (Baker 2002); that better alignment
between the performance measures increases monetary incentives, and that the bet-
ter aligned the performance measure is with the true value, the higher is the (total)
surplus among the principal and the agent. The rst of these two results is how-
ever not trivial since better alignments strengthens the ratchet elements. This e¤ect
tends to lower monetary incentives. We can however show that this latter e¤ect
will never dominate the direct e¤ect of better alignments, and hence that monetary
incentives do increase with better alignments.
It is often the case that in addition to veriable (and distorted) performance
measures, there are other non-veriable measures that may yield valuable informa-
tion about the agents performance. A typical case is one where quantity aspects
are veriable but quality aspects are not, yet some information about these quality
aspects is observable for the relevant parties. Such information may be hard or
impossible to verify in a court, but may be used by principals and peers to asses
agentsabilities and performance, and hence induce implicit incentives for agents to
exert e¤ort.
We also consider such a setting, and show that some new issues arise.1 In par-
ticular, we point out the following features. First we show that career and monetary
incentives may be complements rather than substitutes, second that incentives may
increase with more distortion in the (veriable) performance measure, and nally
that it may well be advantageous (in terms of total surplus) that the veriable
performance measure is distorted relative to the measure of true value.
The intuition for the rst result is that in a setting where e¤orts on quality
aspects are rewarded by strong implicit career incentives, and where e¤orts on quality
1 In addition to measures y and z, there is now a third non-veriable measure q. We may think
of y reecting the true mix of quality and quantity aspects that the principal cares about, z being
a veriable measure of quantity aspects, and q being a non-veriable measure of quality aspects.
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and quantity aspects are substitutes for the agent, the principal may have to match
strong implicit incentives on qualitywith strong explicit incentives on quantity.
We also note that this mechanism behind the complementarity result is di¤erent
from the one obtained in Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999). In their analysis
a complementarity e¤ect between monetary and career incentives may arise when
there is a technological complementarity between e¤ort and talent in the way they
a¤ect performance.
To see the intuition behind the second result (that incentives may increase with
more distortion), note that career concerns and monetary incentives are always
substitutes when only one veriable (and non-distorted) performance measure is
available, and e¤ort a¤ects this measure additively (Gibbons and Murphy 1992).
In such a case the principal never needs to match strong career incentives with
strong monetary incentives. But if it is the case that additional non-veriable per-
formance measures are available, and career concerns and monetary incentives are
complements, more distortion may imply that the principal has to increase mone-
tary incentives to maintain the appropriate balance of the agents e¤ort among the
tasks. Hence in this case, and opposed to what is suggested in Kerr (1975), it may
be appropriate to reward for A, while hoping for B.2
An intuition for the third result (that distortion may be advantageous) goes as
follows. If some non-veriable measure of quality aspects is not aligned with the
true value, and implicit incentives on this measure induces the agent to focus on
these quality aspects, then it may be advantageous that explicit incentives can be
used to induce e¤orts on quantity aspects rather than on a balanced mix of both
aspects. This is just to say that it may be advantageous that the veriable measure
is not perfectly aligned with the measure of true value.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the basic model is outlined,
while the optimal contracts are derived in section 3. In section 4 we consider the
case where an additional non-veriable measure provides some information about
the agents performance. First we analyze under which conditions career concerns
and monetary incentives are complements (section 4.1). Then, in section 4.2 we
show that incentives may increase with more distortion. Finally, in section 4.3 we
show that if may be advantageous (in terms of total surplus) that the veriable
performance measure is distorted relative to the measure of true value. Section 5
provides some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
There is one agent, n tasks, and two periods. The model is a dynamic variant of the
framework used by Feltham and Xie (1994) and Baker (2002) to analyze distorted
performance measures. In each period the agent privately supplies his choice of
e¤ort at= (at1; at2; :::; atn) on the n tasks. The agents choice of e¤orts determines
2A similar result is shown in Schnedler (2003) in the case where the principal does not know the
set of actions the agent can choose.
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the agents total contribution to the principal, denoted by yt: That is, yt reects
everything the principal cares about, except for wages, in period t: We assume that
no contract on y can be enforced in court because it is prohibitively costly to specify
this outcome ex ante in such a way that it can be veried by a third party ex
post. We do however assume that all partiesinsiders as well as outsidersobserve
the y signal ex post, and favorable realizations of this signal improves the agents
standing on the job market. Hence, some incentives are provided for y through
career concerns.
Let
yt = h
0 + fat + "t;
where f = ff1; f2; :::; fng is an n-dimensional vector of marginal products of the
agents e¤orts, fat = f1at1+ :::+fnatn denotes the scalar product, and "t  N(0; 2y)
represents random e¤ects.  is the agents unknown ability. The ability  is drawn
at the beginning of the rst period from an independent normal distribution with
mean m0 and variance 2: The agents ability has productivity h
0 for the principal.
While the agents total contribution is not veriable, there is a performance
measure z that is veriable, so monetary incentives can be provided through this
signal. Incentives on this signal serves as a means to increase the agents total
contribution for the principal. Let
zt =  + gat + t;
where g =fg1; g2; :::; gng is an n-dimensional vector of the marginal products of ac-
tions on the veriable performance measure and t  N(0; 2z) is the e¤ect of uncon-
trollable events. Let  be independent of " and of : Since z is veriable all parties
observe it. We summarize the information given to the principal by the signals in
period t by xt = (yt; zt) : Furthermore, we assume that the principal o¤ers the agent
linear payments wt = At + tzt.3
The agent which is risk-averse privately chooses actions ati; i = 1; :::; n: The
private cost of e¤ort in monetary units is denoted c(at), and is (for simplicity)
assumed to be a quadratic expression. For most of the analysis (section 4 is the
exception) we assume that e¤ort costs are independent across tasks, and hence
given by c(at) =
Pn
i=1
a2ti
2 :
The agents utility function is exponential, and there is no discouning:
u =   expf r
2X
t=1
[wt   c(at)]g;
where the coe¢ cient r  0 measures the agents risk aversion. With linear com-
pensation, exponential utility, and normal random variables, the agents certainty
equivalent is CE =
P
t [Ewt   c(at)]   r2var(w1 + w2); where E is the expectation
operator.
3The focus on linear contracts can be justied by appeal to a richer dynamic model in which
linear payments are optimal Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987).
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The principal is risk neutral, has net benet in period t given by yt   wt, and
can observe neither the actions taken by the agent nor his ability. She only observes
the signals xt = (yt; zt) and may use it in every period to update her beliefs about
the agents ability.
The parties cannot commit not to renegotiate contracts. The second-period
contract will therefore be e¢ cient, given the information available at that time.
3 Optimal Contracts
We rst characterize the optimal contract in the second, and last period. Note that
there are no career incentives in this period, and hence the optimal incentives in
period 2 correspond to the optimal bonus in the one-period model.
Second period. The true expected value for the principal is E(y2 j x1) = h0E( j
x1)+fa2; where the expectation is conditional on the signals x1 = (y1; z1) observed in
period 1. The expected value of the veriable measure isE(z2 j x1) = E( j x1)+ga2;
where E( j x1) reects the updated belief about the agents ability, and is given by
E( j x1) = E + z(z1  Ez1) + y(y1  Ey1): (1)
The exact expressions for the regression coe¢ cients i =
@
@iE ( j x1) ; i = y; z are
contained in Appendix A. Here we simply note that i 2 [0; 1] and depends on
the noise terms 2i ; i = ; y; z; as well as the productivity parameter of ability h
0:
Furthermore we note that the if the z signal is more noisy than the y signal (i.e.
2z > 
2
y); more weight is put on y relative to z in estimating the agents ability.
The certainty equivalent for the agent in period 2 is
CE2 = Ew2   c(a2)  r
2
var(w2 j x1) = A2 + 2ga2   i
a2i2
2
  r
2
22
2
2c;
where 22c := var(z2 j x1) = var( j x1) + var(): (Again we refer to Appendix A
for the exact expression of the conditional variance.) The agent chooses e¤ort a2 to
maximize this certainty equivalent, and this yields
a2 = 2g:
Total expected surplus in period 2 is
TCE2 = E(y2 j x1)  c(a2)  r
2
22
2
2c = h
0E( j x1) + fa2   ia
2
2i
2
  r
2
22
2
2c (2)
By maximizing this w.r.t. 2; and taking into account the agents response, we
obtain the optimal incentive for period 2. It is given by
2 =
fg
jgj2 + r22c
: (3)
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In this expression fg = f1g1 + f2g2 + ::: + fngn is the scalar product of the f and
g vectors, and jgj =
qPn
i=1 g
2
i is the length of the vector of marginal products
on the performance measure. Note that if f = g (i.e., the performance measure
and the principals valuation of the marginal products are perfectly aligned) then
2 =
jf j
jf j+r22c
. In this case the optimal incentive is increasing in the length of
the vector f : This follows since the length is a measure of the contribution of the
agents action to the principals value relative to the contribution of noise in the
production function. Furthermore, the optimal incentive is decreasing in the agents
risk aversion (r) and in the variance of outcome (22c). When f 6= g, the optimal
incentive is reduced, relative to the case where f = g; since paying on z is less
valuable for increasing y: If e.g. f and g are orthogonal, i.e. fg = 0; then 2 = 0,
since the incentives created by paying on z are useless for increasing y: Finally we
note that if fg < 0; i.e., g points oppositeto f ; the optimal bonus is negative, which
may not be feasible. We will assume fg  0.
The sharing of the total surplus TCE2 will be determined by the partiesbar-
gaining strength (and the terms specied in the initial contract). We assume that
the agent has some bargaining power and hence can obtain some share of the sur-
plus. The agents bargaining strength may for instance be due to outside principals
competing for his services in period 2. If the agent can negotiate for himself some
share s of the expected surplus TCE2 (at the start of period 2), then the xed wage
component A2 will be adjusted to reect the information (x1) revealed in period 1
about the agents ability as follows:
A2 = (h  2)E( j x1) + const
where h = sh0 and the constant represent terms that do not depend on x1. The
formula follows from the fact that the agents expected equilibrium payo¤ in period
2 must equal the share s of that periods total surplus, and hence that sTCE2 =
A2 + 

2E(z2 j x1) + k, where k does not depend on x1. Substituting from the
expression for TCE2 above, we see that the stated formula for A2 must hold.
The second-period wage contract o¤ered to the agent is thus:
w2(x1) = (h  2)E( j x1) + 2z2 + const
where the updated expected ability E( j x1) for the agent is given by (1).
First period. After characterizing the second-period wage contract we turn to period
one. First of all we notice that since the second period compensation depends on
the rst period signals, x1 = (y1; z1) ; the agent has incentives to exert e¤ort in the
rst period to increase his market value. The agent thus chooses e¤ort according to
max
a1
f1ga1   c(a1) + (h  2)E( j x1) + constg
) a1 = (1 + z)g + yf ; where z = (h  2)z; y = (h  2)y:
In the last expression i is the implicit incentive on signal i = y; z. We see that this
consists of a positive career element (hi) and a negative ratchet element (

2i).
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The net implicit incentive i may be positive or negative, depending on the sign of
h  2.
To characterize optimal rst-period incentives consider the total intertemporal
surplus, and note that the variance of total wages may be written as
var(w1 + w2) = var(1z1 + yy1 + zz1 + 

2z2)
= var((~1 + 

2z)z1 + hyy1
+2

z2   yy1   zz1

)
where ~1 = 1 + z is the e¤ective incentive on the z variable. The stochastic
variables in the two last lines are uncorrelated, and the variance of the latter (in
square brackets) is 22c = var(z2 j y1; z1). The total intertemporal surplus may
therefore be written as TCE = TCE1 + TCE2 , where TCE2 is the (equilibrium)
second-period surplus and TCE1 is given by
TCE1 = Ey1 c(a1)  r
2
 
(~1 + 

2z)
221z + (hy)
221y + 2(~1 + 

2z)hy1yz

(4)
where 21z = var(z1), 
2
1y = var(y1) and 1yz = cov(y1; z1).
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Maximizing this expression, taking account of the agents e¤ort choice
a1 = ~1g + yf , we see that the optimal e¤ective incentive in period 1 is given by
~1 = 

1 + z =
(1  y)fg   r

2z21z + hy1yz

jgj2 + r21z
: (5)
A number of observations follow directly from this.
1. The career element (hz) in the z variable does not appear in the formula for
the optimal e¤ective incentive and hence has no real e¤ects. The career element
in this variable can be adjusted by monetary incentives and has no implications
for e¤ective incentives and for welfare. This parallels the observation in Meyer
and Vickers (1997) that career incentives have no welfare e¤ects in a setting
where the principal can contract directly on the true value measure (i.e. y in
this model)
2. The ratchet element (2z) in the z variable does have real e¤ects. The rst
term in the square bracket accounts for this ratchet element. This term lowers
e¤ective incentives. It is costlyin terms of risk coststo compensate with
monetary incentives for the ratchet element, and hence e¤ective incentives
are optimally reduced. This is in line with results for settings where one can
contract directly on the measure of true value (e.g. Gibbons 1987, Meyer,
Olsen, and Torsvik 1996).
3. Both the career element and the ratchet element in the y variable do have
real e¤ects (recall that y = (h 2)y). A higher career element in y reduces
4We have 21z = 
2
z + 
2
, 
2
1y = 
2
y + 
2
 and 1yz = 
2
 in the given specication.
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e¤ective incentives on z. Career incentives (on y as well as on z) and monetary
incentives are thus substitutes. The latter property is in line with ndings
for the setting where one can contract directly on the measure of true value
(Gibbons and Murphy 1992), but the fact that career elements have real e¤ects
is at variance with results from that setting (Meyer and Vickers 1997). In the
present model the career element in the y variable works via two channels.
First it increases net incentives y on y, and when f and g are to some extent
aligned (fg > 0), incentives on z can then be reduced. Second, a strong career
element on y will increase the variance of payments, and thus the risk costs.
When the the y; z  variables are (positively) correlated, this variance can be
reduced by reducing the explicit incentive on the z  variable
4. A stronger ratchet element in the y variable will (all else equal) increase opti-
mal e¤ective (and monetary) incentives on z. The reason is that the stronger
ratchet element reduces net incentives y on y, and when f and g are to some
extent aligned (fg > 0), incentives on z should be increased to compensate
for the reduced incentives on y. The fact that stronger ratchet e¤ects may
increase monetary incentives is quite opposite to what one nds in settings
where contracting on a non-distorted measure is feasible (e.g. Gibbons 1987,
Meyer and Vickers 1997).
5. Comparing e¤ective incentives over time (~1 and 2), we see that these are
highest in period 2 when net implicit incentives on y are non-negative (y 
0). Monetary incentives are then also highest in period 2, since net implicit
incentives on z are non-negative as well (z  0).
We summarize these results in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 For independent e¤orts we have:
(i) While the career element (hz) in the performance measure (z) can be cost-
lessly neutralized by monetary incentives and has thus no e¤ects on total surplus,
the ratchet element (2z) in this measure lowers e¤ective incentives and thus does
have real e¤ects.
(ii) Both the career element and the ratchet element in the value measure (y) do have
real e¤ects. A higher career element in y reduces e¤ective incentives on z. Career
incentives (on y as well as on z) and monetary incentives are thus substitutes.
(iii) A stronger ratchet element in the y variable will (all else equal) increase opti-
mal e¤ective (and monetary) incentives on z.
(iv) Given non-negative net implicit incentives (y; z  0), then optimal monetary
incentives are increasing over time, i.e., 1 < 2:
Following Baker (2002) we can use the angle  between vectors f and g, dened by
cos  = fgjf jjgj , as a measure of how distorted or misaligned the performance measure z
is from the measure of true value y. In a static setting and here for period 2one sees
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that incentives on the performance measure z are stronger the better aligned are the
two measures. In a dynamic setting the relationship is more complicated. From the
formula (5) for the e¤ective rst-period incentive ~1, we see that there are both direct
and indirect e¤ects associated with better alignment. First there is a direct positive
e¤ect in that fg gets larger. (We keep jf jjgj xed and consider only parameters
that yield non-negative incentives, so in particular y < 1.) But second, there are
indirect e¤ects working via the ratchet elements. This is so because better alignment
increases second-period incentives (2), and this in turn strengthens the ratchet
elements. There are two ratchet elements; one associated with the z  measure
(2z) and one associated with the y  measure (2y, which enters through y =
(h  2)y). The latter increases the rst-period optimal e¤ective incentive ~1 (by
reducing the net implicit incentive y on y, which is optimally compensated by
a stronger monetary incentive on z). But the stronger ratchet element associated
with z reduces the e¤ective incentive ~1. Hence we see that better alignment induces
opposing e¤ects on the rst-period e¤ective incentive.
Although there are opposing e¤ects generated by dynamic implicit incentives, it
turns out that better alignment does in fact increase e¤ective incentives also in the
rst period, at least for all parameters that yield non-negative e¤ective incentives
in this model. We verify this in Appendix A. Note that this implies that monetary
incentives must also increase (and by even more) since the implicit incentive z is
reduced.
In Appendix A we also verify the intuitively reasonable result that the equilib-
rium surplus (TCE) is also higher the better aligned is the performance measure
with the measure of true value. Thus we have:
Proposition 2 For independent e¤orts and parameters that yield non-negative ef-
fective incentives we have: As the performance measure z gets better aligned with
(less distorted from) the measure of value y, (i) optimal e¤ective and monetary in-
centives in both periods increase, and (ii) the total surplus increases.
These results show that to the extent that design of performance measures is
feasible, it is (all else equal) optimal to construct or choose a measure that is least
distorted relative to the measure of true value. As we shall see in the next section,
this is however generally true only when such performance measures are veriable.
4 Additional Non-Veriable Measures
It is often the case that in addition to veriable (and distorted) performance mea-
sures, there are other non-veriable measures that may yield valuable information
about the agents performance. A typical case is one where quantity aspects are ver-
iable but quality aspects are not, yet some information about these quality aspects
is observable for the relevant parties. Such information may be hard or impossible
to verify in a court, but may be used by principals and peers to asses agentsabilities
and performance, and hence induce implicit incentives for agents to exert e¤ort.
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We now consider such a setting, and show that some new issues arise. In par-
ticular, we point out three new features: (i) that career and monetary incentives
may be complements rather than substitutes, (ii) that incentives may increase with
more distortion in the (veriable) performance measure, and (iii) that it may well
be advantageous (in terms of total surplus) that the veriable performance measure
(z) is distorted relative to the measure of true value (y). The intuition for (i) is that
in a setting where e¤orts on quality aspects are rewarded by strong implicit career
incentives, and where e¤orts on quality and quantity aspects are substitutes for the
agent, the principal may have to match strong implicit incentives on qualitywith
strong explicit incentives on quantity.
To see the intuition behind the second result, note that career concerns and mon-
etary incentives always are substitutes when only one veriable (but non-distorted)
performance measure is available. In such a case the principal never needs to match
strong career incentives with strong monetary incentives. The result (ii) follows
when more distortion implies that the principal has to increase monetary incentives
to maintain the appropriate balance of the agents e¤ort among the tasks.
An intuition for result (iii) is that if some non-veriable measure (say q) of quality
aspects is not aligned with the true value (y), and implicit incentives on this measure
induces the agent to focus on these quality aspects, then it may be advantageous
that explicit incentives can be used to induce e¤orts on quantity aspects rather than
on a balanced mix of both aspects. This is just to say that it may be advantageous
that the veriable measure (z) is not aligned with the measure of true value (y).
To model these issues, suppose now there is an additional non-contractible qual-
ityvariable
qt = kat +  + t
where k is an n-dimensional vector, and t is a noise term. To simplify the exposition
in this section, we henceforth consider risk-neutral agents. On the other hand we
allow for non-independence among e¤orts in the agents cost function. E¤ort costs
are
c(a) =
1
2
a0Ca =
1
2
X
i;j
cijaiaj
where C is a symmetric matrix. (The prime denotes transpose.) We consider the
three issues in turn.
4.1 Career and Monetary Incentives as Complements
In the second period the agent chooses e¤ort a2 to maximize 2ga2 c(a2), which
implies Ca2 = 2g (marginal cost equals marginal income for each e¤ort compo-
nent). Given this e¤ort choice, the principal chooses the bonus 2 on z2 to maximize
Ey2   c(a2) = 2f 0C 1g 22 12g0C 1g. The second-period (and static) optimal in-
centive on z is thus
2 =
f 0C 1g
g0C 1g
> 0
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We assume that both terms entering the fraction on the right are positive.
In period 1 the agent faces implicit incentives on the three measures y; z; q. These
incentives are given by
i = (h  2)i, i = y; z; q
where the is are the regression coe¢ cients for the conditional expectation of abil-
ity (), given rst-period observations (y1; z1; q1).5 The agent optimally chooses
e¤orts such the vector of marginal costs (the cost gradient Ca1) equals the vector
of marginal benets, i.e.
Ca1 = ~1g + yf + qk, ~1 = 1 + z (6)
Here 1 and ~1 denote as before the explicit (monetary) and the e¤ective incentives,
respectively, on the veriable performance measure z. Maximization of the rst-
period surplus h0+ fa1  c(a1) with a1 given by (6), yields the optimal rst-period
e¤ective incentive
~1 = 

1 + z = (1  y)
f 0C 1g
g0C 1g
  q
k0C 1g
g0C 1g
(7)
We see that explicit incentives 1 are decreasing in y and in z, so explicit incentives
and the implicit incentives on measures z and y are still substitutes.
Whether the implicit incentive q on the non-veriable qualitymeasure q also
is a substitute to the explicit incentive 1, depends on the sign of k0C 1g. The
point is now that this expression may well be negative; an illustrative case is given
below. In such cases we see that 1 and q are complements; a stronger implicit
incentive on q implies a stronger optimal explicit incentive on z.
Rewriting the above expression (7) in terms of career and rachet elements we
have
~1 = 

1 + (h  2)z = (1  (h  2)y)
f 0C 1g
g0C 1g
  (h  2)q
k0C 1g
g0C 1g
We may then ask whether a stronger career element (e.g. larger h) may increase
e¤ective and explicit incentives. The former is obviously the case if  qk0C 1g >
yf
0C 1g, and the latter holds if  qk0C 1g > yf 0C 1g+ zg0C 1g. Any of these
inequalities may hold (see below). Thus, stronger career e¤ects may well increase
e¤ective as well as explicit incentives; career incentives and explicit incentives may
thus be complements.
Example 1. The following 2-dimensional case illustrates these results. Suppose
tasks 1 and 2 promote quantity and quality, respectively, and that the true respective
marginal values are given by (f1; f2). Suppose further that the veriable performance
measure z only reects quantity aspects, and the non-veriable measure q only
5Note that the regression coe¢ cients are di¤erent now compared to those outlined in the former
sections. In Appendix A we give the exact formulas.
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reects quality aspects. Suppose also that e¤orts on the two tasks are substitutes
for the agent. The relevant parameters then have the following form
f 0 = (f1; f2), g0 = (g1; 0), k0 = (0; k2), C =

1 
 1

, 0 <  < 1
Here we nd
f 0C 1g =
(f1   f2) g1
1  2 , k
0C 1g =
 k2g1
1  2
The optimal rst- and second-period bonuses are
2 =
f 0C 1g
g0C 1g
=
(f1   f2) g1
g21
=
f1   f2
g1
~1 = 

1 + (h  2)z = (1  (h  2)y)
(f1   f2)
(1  2)g1 + (h  

2)q
k2
(1  2)g1
Here we see that the e¤ective incentive ~1 is increasing in the career incentive para-
meter h if qk2 > y(f1 f2). The monetary incentive 1 will be increasing in this
parameter if qk2 > y(f1 f2)+z. There are obviously parameter combinations
(say f1   f2 small, k2 large and g1 small) that satisfy these inequalities.
The analysis in this section is summed up in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 When e¤orts are substitutes and there is an additional non-veriable
performance measure (q) we have: stronger career e¤ects may well increase e¤ective
as well as explicit incentives; career incentives and explicit incentives may thus be
complements.
In particular, under risk neutrality career incentives and explicit incentives are com-
plements when  qk0C 1g > yf 0C 1g + zg0C 1g.
4.2 Distortion and Incentives
We now consider the relationship between distortion and incentive strength in the
extended model. We want to make the point that in this setting it may well be
the case that rst-period incentives become stronger when the performance measure
becomes more distorted. While it is still the case that second-period (and static)
incentives are maximal when the performance measure is non-distorted (i.e. when
g = f), rst-period incentives may well be much lower for the non-distorted com-
pared to a distorted measure.
To see this consider the optimal rst-period incentives as given by (7). Let
superscript P refer to the case of a perfect(non-distorted) measure (g = f), and
note that the second-period optimal incentive in this case is P2 = 1. Comparing
incentives for this non-distorted measure to some other measure (g 6= f) we have
~P1 = 
P
1 + 
P
z = (1  Py )1  Pq
k0C 1f
f 0C 1f
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~1 = 

1 + z = (1  y)2   q
k0C 1g
g0C 1g
and Pi = (h   1)i, i = (h   2)i. Comparing these two we see that, although
2 < 1 and hence a lower net implicit incentive on y (y < 
P
y ) tend to make
the e¤ective rst-period incentive lower in the distorted case, the term associated
with implicit incentives on the non-veriable measure q may compensate for that.
In particular, we may have k0C 1f > 0 and k0C 1g < 0. In such cases one can
easily verify that e¤ective and monetary incentives may be higher for the distorted
measure than for the non-distorted one. We illustrate this with an example.
Example 2. Consider the example in the previous section. Mainly to simplify
notation we specialize and consider some numerical values. Let
f 0 = (1; 1), g0 = (2; 0), k0 = (0; k2),  =
1
2
Then we nd k
0C 1f
f 0C 1f =
f1k2
2 =
k2
2 ,
k0C 1g
g0C 1g =  k2g1 =  k24 , 2 =
f1(1 )
g1
= 14 , and
hence
~P1 = 
P
1 + 
P
z = (1  Py )  Pq
k2
2
~1 = 

1 + z = (1  y)
1
4
+ q
k2
4
with Pi = (h   1)i, i = (h   14)i. There is clearly a range of values for the
remaining parameters that yields higher incentives for the distorted measure (~1 >
~P1 and 1 > P1 ).
Proposition 4 When e¤orts are substitutes and there is an additional non-veriable
measure (q) we have: While second-period (and static) incentives are maximal when
the veriable performance measure (z) is non-distorted (i.e. when g = f), rst-
period incentives may well be much lower for a non-distorted compared to a distorted
measure
4.3 Non-Distorted Performance Measure Is Not Optimal
In this section we consider the relationship between distortion and total surplus.
We consider variations in the performance measure (z), and in particular variations
in its degree of distortion from the true value, as measured by the angle  between
vectors g and f . To simplify we consider risk neutral agents. In a static case it will
be optimal to have a veriable performance measure (z) that is completely aligned
with (non-distorted from) the true value (y), i.e. such that  = 0, or equivalently
g = f ,  > 0. The rst-best can then be achieved under risk neutrality (by setting
 =  1).
For the dynamic case we want to point out that, unless the non-veriable quality
measureq is completely aligned with the true value y, it will not be optimal to have
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g completely aligned with f . Thus, in the presence of dynamic implicit incentives it
will in most cases not be optimal to have a perfectveriable performance measure.
The intuition is fairly simple; when there are (say) career incentives on q, the
agents attention is drawn in the direction dened by vector k. Ideally the agents
e¤orts should be aligned with f . When k and f are not aligned, monetary incentives
on g should ideally draw the agents attention towards f , and this will generally not
be least costly to do when g is perfectly aligned with f .
For notational simplicity consider independent e¤orts (c(a) = 12a
0a). For given
performance measures the optimal surplus can be written as6
TCE = TCE1 + TCE

2
= max
~1

f 0a1(~1)  c(a1(~1))

+max
2

f 0a2(2)  c(a2(2))

where
a2(2) = 2g, a1(~1) = ~1g + yf + qk
Consider a marginal variation in the component gi; this yields
@TCE
@gi
= (fi   a1i)~1 + (fi   a2i)2
= ((1  y)fi   ~1gi   qki)~1 + (fi   2gi)2
We see that for g = f (perfect alignment) the second term in the above expression
vanishes, but the rst term does not, and hence such perfect alignment will not be
optimal.
In fact, the formula shows that some linear combination, say g = f +k, will be
optimal. In practice it will hardly be possible to ne-tune performance measures to
nd the optimal balance, so to characterize the optimum may not be so interesting.
The point we want to make is that some distortedperformance measure may in
these cases well be better than a non-distorted one.
Proposition 5 When there is a distorted non-veriable performance measure (q)
that generates implicit incentives, it is not optimal that the veriable performance
measure (z) is non-distorted.
5 Conclusion
A general problem for designing incentive schemes is that available performance mea-
sures seldom capture precisely agentstrue contributions to principalsobjectives.
In this paper we have analyzed to what extent implicit dynamic incentives such as
career concerns and ratchet e¤ects may alleviate or aggravate these problems.
First we considered the case where the principal provides incentives on a veri-
able, but distorted, performance measure, and in addition some information about
6For notational simplicity we drop the term h0:
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the agents performance is provided to the principal (and the market) through a
non-distorted but non-veriable measure of true value. In this case implicit incen-
tives are related both to the distorted and the undistorted performance measures
(and hence the degree of misalignments between them).
The analysis demonstrated that implicit dynamic incentives have important real
e¤ects in such settings, and that these e¤ects are in several respects di¤erent from
the corresponding e¤ects in settings where a non-distorted performance measure
is available. In particular, we found that both career and ratchet elements have
real e¤ects; neither can costlessly be neutralized by monetary incentives, and that
stronger ratchet e¤ects may increase optimal monetary incentives. The ndings
that career elements may have real e¤ects and that stronger ratchet e¤ects may
increase monetary incentives are quite opposite to what one nds in settings where
contracting on a non-distorted measure is feasible (e.g. Gibbons 1987; Meyer and
Vickers 1997).
The second model we present captures the fact that in addition to a veriable
(and distorted) performance measure, there are often other non-veriable measures
that may yield valuable information about the agents performance. A typical case
is one where quantity aspects are veriable but quality aspects are not, yet some
information about these quality aspects is observable for the relevant parties. In
this setting we show that some new issues arise. Most notably, we show that career
and monetary incentives may be complements rather than substitutes, and that
explicit incentives may increase with more distortion in the (veriable) performance
measure. The latter e¤ect occurs when more distortion induces the principal to
increase monetary incentives in order to maintain an appropriate balance of the
agents e¤ort among tasks. Hence in this case, and opposed to what is suggested in
Kerr (1975), it may be appropriate to reward for A, while hoping for B.
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Appendices
A Technicalities
In this appendix we provide more details regarding some of the calculations in this
paper.
A.1 Regression Coe¢ cients
We rst consider the case outlined in section 2 and 3. In this case the information
signals are
yt = h
0
 + fat + "t
zt =  + gat + t:
We seek E(z2 j z1; y1) and E( j z1; y1):The covariance matrixes (z2; z1; y1) and
(; z1; y1) are 24 2 2 h022 2 + 2z h02
h02 h02 (h0)22 + 2y
35 ;
24 2 + 2z 2 h022 2 + 2z h02
h02 h02 (h0)22 + 2y
35 :
By inverting and applying well-known formulas (e.g. DeGroot 1970) we obtain:
22c = V ar(z2 j z1; y1) =
2
2
y
2
z
2
2
y + 
2
zh
022 + 2z2y
+ 2z
z =
@
@z
E( j x1) =
"
2
2
2
y + 
2
zh
022 + 2z2y
#
2y
y =
@
@y
E( j x1) =
"
h02
2
2
y + 
2
zh
022 + 2z2y
#
2z:
Consider the case outlined in Section 4. In this case the information signals are
yt = h
0 + fat + "t
zt =  + gat + t
qt =  + kat + t:
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The covariance matrix for (; y1; z1; q1) is now2664
2 h
02 2 2
h02 h022 + 2y h02 h02
2 h
02 2 + 2z 2
2 h
02 2 2 + 2q
3775
By inverting and applying well-known formulas we get
y =
@
@y
E ( j y1; z1; q1) =
h022z2q
h0222z2q + 2y22q + 2y2z2 + 2y2z2q
z =
@
@z
E ( j y1; z1; q1) =
2
2
y
2
q
h0222z2q + 2y22q + 2y2z2 + 2y2z2q
q =
@
@q
E ( j y1; z1; q1) =
2
2
y
2
z
h0222z2q + 2y22q + 2y2z2 + 2y2z2q
:
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Recall that rst- and section period incentives are given by
~1 = 

1 + z = (1  y)
f 0C 1g
g0C 1g
  q
k0C 1g
g0C 1g
; (5)
2 =
fg
jgj2 + r22c
: (3)
From (3) we have fg = 2K 0, where K 0 = jgj2+ r22c. Better alignment will thus
increase 2. Dening K = jgj2 + r21z, we have moreover from (5)
~1K = (1  y)2K 0   r2z21z   rhy1yz
=

(1  (h  2)y)K 0   rz21z

2   rhy1yz
where in particular the square bracket must be positive. Di¤erentiation yields
@~1
@2
K =

(1  (h  2)y)K 0   rz21z

+ 2yK
0
This is positive for all parameter values that yield non-negative ~1. This proves the
rst part of the proposition.
Consider next the equilibrium total surplus TCE1 + TCE2 . From the envelope
property, and taking into account that the equilibrium rst-period e¤ort is a1 =
~1g+yf , we obtain from (4):
@TCE1
@gi
= fi~

1   a1i~1   r
 
(~1 + 

2z)z
2
1z + zhy1yz
 @2
@gi
= ((1  y)fi   ~1gi)~1   r
 
(~1 + 

2z)
2
1z + hy1yz

z
@2
@gi
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where
@2
@gi
=
@
@gi
figi
g2i + r
2
2c
=
fi 
g2i + r
2
2c
   22gi 
g2i + r
2
2c

In a similar way we obtain from (2):
@TCE2
@gi
= fi

2   a2i2 = (fi   gi2)2
All in all we thus have, for the equilibrium total surplus
@TCE
@gi
= Afi  Bgi
where A;B are independent of i. The formula shows that the surplus is maximal
when the vector g is perfectly aligned with the vector f . QED.
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